The second problem of the Erikson and Tedin analysis is the comparison of Democratic support among mobilized voters against an inappropriate baseline. Their baseline is the Democratic support of established voters in each election. The Democratic support of established voters in a particular year was subtracted from the Democratic support of mobilized voters in the same year. The difference was then used as evidence of mobilization effects and, in conjunction with the proportion of new voters in the electorate, used to calculate the contribution of new voters to partisan change. The problem with this baseline is that it does not permit the full measurement of mobilization effects. It permits only the measurement of mobilization effects on partisan change above and beyond conversion effects. Suppose, for instance, that established (i.e., prerealignment) and new (i.e., realignment era) voters have identical partisan preferences and are of equal size at the end of the realignment period. The contributions of the converted and mobilized voters to partisan change would appear to be equal. However, the Erikson-Tedin analysis would show no mobilization effect whatsoever. All of the partisan change would incorrectly appear to be the result of conversion.
Given the problems of both the Andersen research and the Erikson and Tedin research, the mobilization-conversion controversy remains unsettled. The intent of this research is to gauge more accurately the contributions of both mobilization and conversion to the partisan realignment that took place between 1924 and 1936.2 Unlike the Andersen research, the possibility of both conversion and mobilization will be considered and the contribution of each will be estimated. Also, rather than using partisan recall data from two decades after the realignment period, the Literary Digest and Gallup surveys conducted at the time and used by Erikson and Tedin will be employed. Unlike the research of Erikson and Tedin, prerealignment and realignment era voters (i.e., new voters of 1928, 1932, or 1936) will be separated from one another as clearly as possible for the analysis. The size of each cohort will be estimated from voting records and census information. Finally, the contribution of pre-realignment and realignment era voters to partisan change will be calculated using 1924 pre-realignment partisan loyalties as a baseline, rather than the baseline selected by Erikson and Tedin (i.e., the established voters' loyalties in any given election). These improvements over previous research should yield a more accurate and reliable estimate of the relative importance of mobilization and conversion to realignment.3
Although the principal object of this research is the estimation of mobilization and conversion effects, two related questions will be addressed. First, what accounts for the contributions of mobilization and 2It is an assumption of this research (and of Erikson and Tedin) conversion to partisan change? To the extent that their contributions differ, is it a result of one cohort being larger than the other or of one cohort increasing its loyalty to the Democratic party more than the other? Second, how do the contributions of mobilization and conversion develop over the course of the realignment period? Is mobilization followed by conversion or are they contemporaneous processes? Because of data limitations, any analysis of mobilization and conversion effects during the New Deal realignment requires the imposition of a variey of assumptions (Wanat 1979) . These assumptions will be made explicit at each point in the analysis and the sensitivity of the results to these assumptions will also be explored.
THE ANALYSIS
This analysis will proceed in four steps. The first step is to estimate the dependent variable of the analysis, the extent of partisan change in this period. The second step is to estimate the proportion of pre-realignment voters and the proportion of new voters entering the electorate for the first time in each of the three realignment period elections, 1928, 1932, and 1936. The third step is to estimate the Democratic vote of the prerealignment and realignment era cohorts. The final step, based on the preceding three, is to estimate the contributions of pre-realignment and realignment era voters to partisan change. In effect, this is to measure the extent of mobilization and conversion.
The Extent of Partisan Change
Before examining the sources of partisan change, the extent of that change must be determined. This, after all, is the fact to be explained. The estimate of partisan change is a function of two distinct estimates -an estimate of party loyalties prior to the realignment and of partisan loyalties after the realignment process. These estimates are not only essential to an appraisal of the overall degree of partisan change, but are necessary to the calculation of the contributions of mobilization and conversion to that change.
There are several possible estimates of the partisanship baseline, the extent of Democratic loyalties in the electorate before the realignment. The mortality rates of the older subgroups of new voters are based on the assumption that they are older than those who were first eligible by age to vote in the particular election but that they otherwise have an age distribution like the total population. Given the simple logic that the opportunity to jump into the electorate for the first time presents itself at younger ages before older, the age distribution of the older subgroup of new voters ought to be somewhat younger than the general population. A younger population, of course, means a lower mortality rate. The mortality rate of the pre-realignment groups is perhaps somewhat underestimated because of underestimating its age. The prerealignment voter is one who voted in 1924 or before. Certainly older voters, say those who were first eligible by age to vote in 1900, had more opportunities to vote before 1928 and were probably more likely to have done so than young voters who may have had their only opportunity to vote in the pre-realignment era in the 1924 election. Thus, to assume that the pre-realignment voters' age distribution is like the voting age distribution in the general public probably underestimates the age of pre-realignment voters. To underestimate this group's age is to underestimate its mortality rate. The precise impact of the misestimation of these mortality rates cannot be known without accurate information about the age composition of each group involved; however, the direction of the misestimations is known. Although one might suppose the impact to be slight, if there is any effect at all it would be to underestimate the number and therefore the contribution of mobilized voters and overestimate the number and contribution of converted 
The Democratic Vote in the Electorate
The next step is to reconstruct the party preferences of each group of voters in each of the three realignment era elections. 16 The The Contributions of Conversion and Mobilization It is now possible to estimate the actual contribution of conversion and mobilization to partisan change at each of the three realignment era elections. The elements of conversion and mobilization effects and their contributions to partisan change are presented in Table 3 The 1928 election showed only a small sign of electoral change, only a 3.3 percent gain in the Democratic vote over the pre-realignment normal vote. The evidence suggests that whatever change occurred in this election can be traced entirely to the new voters. The pre-realignment voters actually were slightly less Democratic than they had been traditionally.
The 1932 election showed stronger signs of change. The Democratic vote was about 16.6 percent more than it had been in 1928 and about 19.9 percent more than the pre-realignment normal vote. Conversion and mobilization seem to account nearly equally for this change, though for different reasons. About 9.8 percentage points of the 19.9 percent gain can be traced to pre-realignment voters. They voted 15.5 percentage points more Democratic than prior to the realignment period. Although possibly only an aberration, it might also be evidence of considerable conversion. What makes it particularly important is that it is a shift in a particularly large cohort. In 1932, more than three out of five voters were prerealignment voters. While the contribution of the pre-realignment cohort depends substantially on its size, the contribution of realignment voters depends more heavily on the extent of their Democratic loyalty. Despite being only 37 percent of the voting public, realignment era voters contributed 10.2 percentage points to the 19.9 percent vote change. The basis of this contribution is clear: they were 27.5 percent more Democratic in their vote than were voters prior to the realignment.
In the 1936 election, the balance of mobilization and conversion effects tips again in the direction of mobilization. In this election the Democrats won 23.3 percent more of the vote than their pre-realignment normal vote. Of this gain, 13.8 of it came from realignment era cohorts and 9.5 from the pre-realignment cohorts. In relative terms, 59 percent of this gain was a consequence of mobilization and 41 percent was a consequence of conversion. By this point in the realignment, the groups were of nearly equal size. The difference in their contributions stems entirely from differences in their partisan loyalties. In 1936, realignment era cohorts were 8.6 percent more Democratic than the older pre-realignment voters.
The pattern of mobilization and conversion contributions in these three elections may seem erratic. Mobilization is all that occurs in 1928. Mobilization and conversion contribute equally to change in 1932. Conversion accounts for some change, but mobilization is the greater force in 1936. However, two clear trends underly these findings. One trend is obvious. The proportion of the pre-realignment voters diminishes and the ranks of realignment era voters expand with time. The second and countervailing trend is less obvious. The loyalty differences between the prerealignment and realignment era voters declined over this period. They declined from a 15 percent difference in 1928 to a 12 percent difference in 1932 to an 8.7 percent difference in 1936. To the extent that the vote measures party loyalties, this decline apparently occurred while the Democratic loyalties of both sets of voters were increasing. This trend suggests that the changes in the loyalties of pre-realignment voters lagged behind changes of the realignment era voter.21 Pre-realignment voters, having a voting history and habits built on that history, were slower to move away from their previous standing decisions. Realignment era voters, lacking a voting history and the accompanying habits, had little stake in past partisan divisions and, thus, could change partisan orientations more rapidly.
As 
